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IN SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
JOSEPH JERRY MARAVILLA, 
Claimant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant, 
vs. Docket No.: 43538 
J.R. SIMPLOT COMPANY, 
Defendant/ Appel !ant/Cross-Respondent. 
APPELLANT/CROSS-RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho, 
R.D. Maynard, Chairman presiding. 
Daniel A. Miller 
Residing at Boise, Idaho, for Defendant/ Appellant/Cross-Respondent 
Patrick George 
Residing at Pocatello, Idaho, for Claimant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant 
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1. Did the Industrial Commission commit error when it determined that this Court's 
employer negligence rule as set forth in Liberty Ivfutual v. Adams, 91 Idaho 151,417 
P .2d 417 (1966) was obsolete, because of the passage ofidaho' s comparative fault 
laws that abrogated the common law doctrine of joint and several liability? 
2. If this Court agrees that Simplot' s fault cannot be re-litigated by the Commission due 
to the principals of Res Judicata, is the remainder of the appeal moot? 
ARGUMENT 
I. RES JUDICATA 
A) Privitv 
Claimant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant, Jerry Joseph Maravilla (hereafter "Maravilla"), 
argues that claim preclusion cannot apply to this case because Defendant/ Appellant/Cross-
Respondent, J .R. Simplot Company (hereafter "Simplot"), was not a party to the settlement 
agreement between Maravilla and Idaho Industrial Contractors (IIC) which resolved Maravilla' s third 
party lawsuit against IIC. Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief~ pp. 10-13. 
The issue is not whether Simplot was in privity with Maravilla with respect to Maravilla's 
settlement agreement with IIC. The issue is whether Simplot was in privity with Maravilla with 
respect to Maravilla's third-party negligence action against IIC. As noted in Simplot's initial brief, 
when Maravilla brought his negligence suit, he was doing so not only on his own behalf, he was 
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on as well. Appellant's 
This Court has held that to be a privy, a person not a party to the former action must derive 
his interest from one \vho \Vas a party to it. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 124 (2007). 
Maravilla cites this Court to its decision in Srruhs v. Prot. Techs, 133 Idaho 715, 992 P.2d 
164 ( 1999) as support for his proposition that Simplot was not in privity with Maravilla as it relates 
to the settlement agreement. The Struhs decision actually supports Simplot's position. 
This Court held in Struhs that in a third-party tort case, there is only one cause of action, and 
one right to subrogation, and when the employee brings their third-party action, the employer and 
its insurer are bound by estoppel to the results of that trial conducted by the employee. Srruhs, 
133 Idaho at 721. This Court also held that when Struhs brought his action against the third-party, 
the employer's right to subrogation vvas derivative of Struhs' recovery. Id. emphasis added. The 
employer was not required to file a separate tort claim against the third-party to preserve its right to 
subrogation. Id. 
This Court's decision in Struhs settles the issue of whether Simplot was in privity with 
Maravilla in Maravilla's third-party lawsuit with IIC. It is not relevant to this Court's decision of 
whether Simplot was a privy to Maravilla's settlement agreement with UC. The Struhs' decision 
simply held that the employee and third-party cannot by way of a settlement agreement that the 
employer did not participate in, impact the employer's right of subrogation in the settlement 
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B) Claim 
Maravilla argues that Simplot is actually raising the defense of issue preclusion and not 
claim preclusion. Maravilla is mistaken. 
The concept of Res Judicata applies to both claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Ticor, 
supra. The meaning of claim for claim preclusion purposes is very broadly defined. "Claim 
preclusion bars adjudication not only on the matters offered and received to defeat the claim, but 
also as to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit." Ticor, 144 Idaho 
at 123, emphasis added. This Court went on to state that a final judgment extinguishes all claims 
arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions, out of which the cause of action arose. 
Id. 
There is no question that Simplot's fault was raised in the litigation betv,:een Maravilla and 
IIC. Simplot's negligence was a claim made by IIC in the suit. Simplot's alleged fault in Maravilla's 
accident was part of the transaction out of which Maravilla's action arose. Therefore, claim 
preclusion is the appropriate theory to analyze Simplot's Res Judicata defense. 
Maravilla argues that only the Industrial Commission can decide Simplot's subrogation 
interest in Maravilla's settlement proceeds. Maravilla ignores the numerous district court cases that 
resulted in an appeal to this Court, and that are cited by Maravilla in his brief, that totally 
extinguished the employer's subrogated interest in the employee's third-party recovery, starting with 
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91 151,417 4 7 (1 and ending 
Izaguirre v. R&L Carriers Shared Servs., LLC, 155 Idaho 229,308 P3d 929 (2013). It is clear that 
the district courts in Idaho have jurisdiction to determine the claim of whether an employer was at 
fault in an employee's third-party negligence case. ~1ara\rilla's argument that the employer's fault 
is not a claim for claim preclusion purposes is without merit. 
Not only does the district court have jurisdiction to determine the employer's proportionate 
fault, it is really the only forum that is suited to do so. As noted in Simplot' s initial brief, this Court 
has held that Idaho Code §72-223 provides for one action against a third party, and an employer does 
not have to join the third party lawsuit to preserve its right to subrogation. Struhs, 133 Idaho at 721. 
The proper forum to determine the claims in the third party negligence action is the district court 
which is best suited for determining damages, and apportioning fault to each individual or entity that 
contributed to the employee's damages. The determination of fault and damages are not best suited 
for hearing in the Industrial Commission which is charged with overseeing a no-fault system and the 
award of statutory benefits. 
Maravilla argues that to accept Simplot's argument would force claimants to go to trial. This 
is not true. If this Court accepts Simplot's argument this Court's decision would encourage 
plaintiffs attorneys to work with and speak to the employer which has a statutory subrogated interest 
in the outcome of the suit/settlement instead of entering into a settlement agreement without the 
input or consent of the employer and then seeking another forum in an attempt to defeat the 
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s were to s practical 
be an increase in litigation because the employee could settle their case without concern for 
the employer's subrogated interest, and then head to the Commission in an effort to defeat the 
employer's statutory right of reimbursement. 
Maravilla concedes that the "settlement agreement" satisfies the final judgment requirement 
of claim preclusion Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief, p. 15. Maravilla does not really address 
the basis of Simplot' s appeal, that is did the Commission commit an error by ruling that the dismissal 
with prejudice of Maravilla' s third party lawsuit was not a final judgment. As Simplot noted in its 
initial briet: a dismissal of an action with prejudice is a final decision, and acts as an adjudication 
on the merits. (Appellant's Briet: p. 8). This Courts February 12, 2015, Order regarding the form 
of judgments makes it clear that the dismissal with prejudice acted as a final judgment in Maravilla' s 
third party lawsuit with IIC. 
Maravilla's third pai1y lawsuit was dismissed \Vith prejudice, and that dismissal acted as a 
final judgment on the merits of the case. Simplot' s negligence was a claim that was asserted in the 
third party negligence action, and a final judgment was entered in that third party action. There is 
only one third party action and right to subrogation, and the issues related to fault and damages are 
best suited for determination in the district court, not the Industrial Commission. Maravilla is 
prohibited from re-litigating the claim involving Simplot' s fault in another forum. This Court should 
reverse the Commission's decision and hold that Res Judicata does bar the Commission from 
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s s 
II. MOOTNESS DOCTRINE 
A case becomes moot if the party lacks a legally cognizable interest in the outcome or there 
is not at present a real and s11bstantial controv'ersy that is capable of being concluded through judicial 
decree of specific relief. Podsaid v. State Outfitters & Guides Licensing Bd., 356 P.3d 363, 366 
(2015). If this Court finds that the Commission committed error by denying Simplot's Res Judicata 
defense on the basis that there was no final judgment entered in Maravilla's third party lawsuit, then 
the issue regarding the Commission's decision regarding comparative fault is moot because neither 
party vvould have a legally cognizable interest in the outcome as the Commission would not have to 
address Simplot's fault on remand. 
III. COMPARt\ TIVE FAULT 
In the event this Court affirms the Commission as to the issue raised by Simplot in its appeal, 
Simplot offers this response to Maravilla's argument regarding the Commission's decision that the 
abrogation of the common law doctrine of joint and several liability in Idaho rendered this Court's 
employer negligence rule in Liberty 1vfutual obsolete. 
There is no argument that this Court has had the same rule regarding how the finding of 
negligence on the part of the employer terminates the employer's right to subrogation to an injured 
worker's third party recovery. The real issue is should this Court's rule, which came about long 
before the advent of comparative fault and the abolition of joint and several liability, continue to 
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statutes and the 
liability? 
In the case of Pocatello Indus. Park Co. v. Steel W, 101 Idaho 783,621 P.2d 399 (1980), an 
employee of Steel \X/ est by the name of Croft \Vas injured b~y a malft1nctioning door that fell on him. 
The building was o,vned by Pocatello Industrial Park and leased by Steel West. Steel West's 
workmen's compensation carrier paid Croft a little more than $14,000 in worker's compensation 
benefits. Croft sued Pocatello Industrial in District Court. Following a court trial the District Court 
found that Croft's damages were $80,000 and that Croft was 20% negligent and Pocatello Industrial 
Park ,vas 80% negligent. The District Court then reduced Croft's recovery by 20%, and it further 
reduced the recovery by an additional $14,000 representing the subrogated amount of worker's 
compensation benefits paid by Steel West's carrier. Pocatello Industrial Park asked the District 
Court to reconsider and the District Court amended its findings by reducing Pocatello Industrial 
Park's negligence to 72% and increasing Croft's negligence to 28%. The District Court also 
amended the decision with respect to the worker's compensation benefits by not reducing Croft's 
recovery, instead the District Court ruled that Croft's recovery was subject to any lien or subrogation 
rights of the compensation carrier. Pocatello Industrial Park appealed. In reaching its decision on 
appeal this Court commented on its decision in Liberty 1v!utual v. Adams, 91 Idaho 151 ( 1966); 
"Furthermore, Liberty 1v!utual ,vas decided prior to the Idaho legislature's adoption of a comparative 
negligence statute ... For that reason, the status of the Liberty Afutual rule barring subrogation is 
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(1979), that question was expressly reserved for another day." Pocatello Indus. Park Co., l 01 Idaho 
at 788. 
Iv1aravilla is correct \Vhen he traces this Court's rule regarding a negligent employer losing 
its right to subrogation back to 1966 and the Liberty Afutual case. However, after this Court's 
pronouncement in Tucker that it would address the Liberty Afutual decision for another day, that day 
never did come. To date this Court has not addressed the issue of whether the passage ofldaho's 
statutes abolishing joint and several liability, and enacting individual comparative responsibility 
makes the rule set forth in Liberty Afutual obsolete. 
The Commission discussed this Court's decision in Tucker at length. In Tucker this Court 
refused to adopt the doctrine of comparative fault in a case where a plaintiffs employer was found 
to be partially at fault for the accident. Tucker, l 00 Idaho at 592. This Court noted that if it did 
adopt the doctrine of comparative fault, the third party tortfeasor would "escape liability for the total 
damages to plaintiff otherwise assigned to him by the traditional doctrine of the joint and several 
liability of joint tortfeasors." Id. Tucker's employer had paid him over $16,000.00 in benefits at the 
time of the trial. The case proceeded to trial and Tucker was found to be I 0% at fault, Tucker's 
employer was found to be 30% at fault, and the third party was found to be 60% at fault. Tucker, 
100 Idaho at 593. The trial court reduced Tucker's award by the percentage of his fault, but it did 
not reduce his award by the amount of worker's compensation benefits paid to him by his employer. 
The third party asked the trial court to reduce the damages by the amount of the worker's 
compensation benefits paid to Tucker. The trial court refused the third party's requested reduction. 
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on as it read at the s suit, 
which statute continued to preserve the common law of joint and several liability, when it held that 
the third party's liability would not be limited to just its proportionate fault. Tucker, l 00 Idaho at 
598. This Court also determined that to av,.oid a double reco\'ery Tucker's damages should be 
reduced by the amount of worker's compensation benefits received by Tucker. Id. This Court held 
that this would be an equitable result because pursuant to the holding of Liberty 1Hutual Tucker's 
employer had lost its subrogation right, and its ability to obtain reimbursement from the employee. 
The Commission's decision explains why this Court's rule regarding a negligent employer 
made sense under the doctrine of joint and several liability that existed at the time of the Liberty 
A1utual decision. R., p. 158-163. In 1987 the Idaho legislature abolished joint and several liability, 
and instituted individual comparative fault and responsibility in negligence actions. LC. §6-802 & 
803(3 ). Since the abolition of joint and several liability, and the implementation of individual 
comparative fault and responsibility, this Court has not addressed if the holding of Liberty klutual 
should be revievved and changed. 
Even though this Court has not directly addressed this issue, the California Courts have. Of 
note is the fact that in Liberty 1vfutual this Court relied on the California case of Witt v. Jackson, 57 
Cal.2d 57, 17 Cal. Rpt. 369, 366 P.2d 641 (1961). In the case of Rodgers v. Workers' Comp. Appeals 
Bd., 36 Cal.3d 330, 682 P.2d 1068 (Calif. 1984), California's Supreme Court discussed the Witt 
decision. The California Supreme Court noted that the Witt decision drew in part on the philosophy 
underlying the then prevailing all or nothing contributory negligence doctrine when the Court in Witt 
held that where the employer's negligence was a concurrent, proximate cause of the injury, the 
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was or 
at 334. The California Supreme Court then noted that with its decision in Associated Construction 
& Engineering Co. v. Worker's Comp. Appeals Bd., 22 Cal.3d 829, 587 P.2d 684 (1978) the rule set 
forth in fVitt v"vas found to be obsolete because California had adopted comparative negligence 
principles. Id. 
Other states which have addressed this issue have come to a similar conclusion. In Aitken 
v. Industrial Comm 'n, 183 Ariz. 387, 904 P.2d 456 (1995) the Supreme Court of Arizona held that 
in order to promote fairness to all parties, and not allow an employer to benefit from his own wrong 
and also to be consistent with the principles of comparative fault, the negligent employer would still 
have its lien but the lien would apply to only those benefits paid that exceed the employer's 
proportionate share of the total damages fixed by the verdict in the action. Aitken, 183 Ariz. at 392. 
The Washington Supreme Court held that the principles of comparative negligence requires 
a finding of reduction, not elimination, of the employers' s statutory right to reimbursement. United 
Stares Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Wash. v. Pacificorp., 118 Wn.2d 167,185,822 P.2d 162, 180 
(1991), unrelated part of holding superceded by statute. The Washington court also held that when 
there is multiple parties involved in an accident, the only satisfactory method of dealing with a 
multiple party accident is through a single action to apportion fault and allocate damages based on 
the apportionment of fault. Id. 
This Court has the opportunity to reconsider its holding in Liberty 1vfutual The rationale 
behind the decision in Liberty 1vfutual was based on the all or nothing contributory negligence 
doctrine that existed at the time of the decision but which has been abolished in Idaho for decades. 
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no sense to to to ona 
been abandoned by Idaho. As the courts of other states have noted, there is a balanced approach that 
does not allow an employer to profit by its \Hong doing, and that is consistent with the principals 
of comparative fault. In its decision the Commission vvent through several scenarios that shovvcd 
how an injured worker would not be prejudiced by using a comparative fault approach to an 
employer's subrogated interest. R., p. 166-169. 
This Court should hold that in the event an employer is found to be partially responsible for 
an employee's injury the employer's right of subrogation will be the amount of benefits paid that 
exceeds the employer's proportionate share of the total damages that are fixed by a verdict in the 
action. Since there is no jury verdict in this case, and only a settlement amount, Simplot's 
subrogated interest should be the amount of benefits it paid that exceeds its proportionate share of 
the settlement agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
Simplot requests that this Court reverse the Commission and hold that Res Judicata bars 
Maravilla from re-litigating the claim of Simplot' s negligence. In the event this Court affirms the 
Commission's Res Judicata decision, Simplot requests that the rule announced by this Court in 
Liberty Afutual be overturned as obsolete and that Simplot' s right of subrogation would be the 
amount that exceeds its proportionate share of the settlement proceeds based on its fault, if any. 
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